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Abstract: The view that European institutions do not operate with maximum efficiency, that they are 
not yet able to cope with all major economic and social problems, to fully meet the basic functions, that 
cannot adapt to rapidly changing world has not emerged in recent years.  In this paper we try to clarify the 
concept of institutional efficiency, and try to follow from a chronological perspective the main events that led 
to the more or less efficient European institutions. 
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The problem of assessing „efficiency‖ in the realm of institutions stirs many controversies 
(note that the actual "efficiency‖ criterion is a controversial topic among economists). If efficiency 
is defined in terms of an objective value indicator, identifiable and measurable , then maximizing 
this indicator requires the existence of a unique arrangement of market outcomes. 
This  understanding  is  the  core  of  the  welfare  economy  built  around  the  Pareto  static 
efficiency criterion. According to Pareto, an arrangement is efficient if there are other arrangements 
possible  that  could  benefit  a  person,  without  disadvantaging  another.    Paretian  criterion  for 
assessing the efficiency is proved, however, unrealistic and impractical in the terms of the dynamic 
market  process,  as  a  constantly  changing  reality  with  many  changes  in  the  expectations  of 
participants.  In  the  real  world,  which  is  governed  by  the  policies  and  too  often  subject  to 
government intervention, it is almost impossible to conceive Pareto-optimal solutions. 
Changing institutions determine, necessarily, a change in the allocation of resources, which 
is equivalent to saying that individuals behave differently in a different institutional framework. 
Modifying the constraints and incentives within which human action takes place means changing 
opportunity costs and relative prices in the entire spectrum of human action. 
  This entails, in essence, changing the preferences and the economic and ethical nature of 
people.  Therefore,  any  allocation  of  resources  that  can  be  classified  as  "effective"  depends,  
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necessarily, on the institutional framework in which decisions on the use of resources are evaluated 
and adopted. 
  If efficiency is determined by what results from voluntary agreements, then we will have to 
accept the non-uniqueness set of rules and institutions that can satisfy the "criterion of efficiency." 
In a set of rules and institutions, Buchanan & Tullock (1962, p. 84) states that  "what is 
effective is the result of voluntary agreements and not vice versa." Non-reciprocity clause would 
mean that not every state of things resulting from voluntary exchange process is effective. 
This approach is subject to the general equilibrium vision, the market situation in which, ex post, no 
person shall obtain suboptimal results in relation to its plans and expectations. However, only ex 
ante human action is always optimal. 
  The existence of an entrepreneurial error makes that, ex post, the state of things always be 
suboptimal to an ex ante economic configuration. Hülsmann (2000) shows, that the development of 
a realistic analysis on the 'equilibrium' and 'efficiency', starts from the comparison of every choice 
(action) to its counter factual alternatives (in terms of success and failure). 
The problem of institutional change makes it necessary to explain the relationship between 
survival  of  certain  institutions,  institutional  arrangements  and  efficiency.  As  Douglass  North's 
(1990, p. 25) states, social institutions reduce uncertainty in human interactions, which does not 
necessarily imply that all these institutions are effective.  
  In an institutional analysis, efficiency indicates the conditions and framework of constraints 
and incentives that will produce the highest growth. 
Uncertainty reduction does not require the existence of a single institutional structure and 
the capacity of these institutions in facilitating similar production of material wealth. Thus, the issue 
of explaining the survival of  institutions  and  institutional  arrangements consistent with reduced 
economic performance. 
  Olson (1984) uses the concept of "institutional sclerosis" for the emergence and persistence 
of dysfunctional and ineffective institutions 
The history of European integration after the Second World War was marked by phases of 
dynamic growth, stagnation and reorientation attempts. Successful implementation of the customs 
union  in  the  period  1957  -  1968  was  followed  by  a  phase  of  disorientation  and  increased 
heterogeneity in the 1970s and early 1980s. Similarly, completing the single market from 1985 to 
1992 was followed by a period of silence. Efforts to introduce the single currency did not led to a 
new dynamic of integration. 
In the early 1980s, "eurosclerosis" had two different meanings: it described the difficulty of 
European countries to deal with their internal problems, but also the difficulty of European states to  
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overcome  the  European  integration.  Two  cases  have  resulted  in  overcoming  the  difficulties  of 
European integration. 
In 1974, the European Court of Justice decision on the „Dassonville" case, determined that 
all regulations acting as non-tariff trade barriers must be removed. 
By this decision, the Court allowed the competition between different national  rules and 
pointed out how Member States can overcome future barriers to the flow of production factors by 
mutual recognition of standards. 
  The second case to overcome "eurosclerosis" was the program for establishing the Common 
Market  in  1985  in  order to overcome  the  economic  and  political  problems  of  integration.  279 
proposals have been adopted for the abandonment of non-tariff barriers, protection and control of 
national borders. 
  Mutual recognition of standards, based on the minimum level of European harmonization, 
has been characterized as a "new approach" of the EU. Single Market Plan, aimed at reducing at the 
same time, hundreds of protectionist legislation in all Member States, was a success. 
  In the years that followed, the EEC had regained optimism and went from "eurosclerosis" to 
"europhoria", an ebullient optimism regarding the dynamics of integration. 
The  prolonged  recession  in  the  early  1990s  in  Western  Europe  and  increasing 
unemployment to record levels, starting from the already high level since 1980, did not helped to 
promote a positive  image of the successes of European  integration. So a new discussion about 
eurosclerosis began. 
EU  institutions  have  also  suffered  from  multiple  sclerosis:  The  Commission,  headed  by 
Jacques Santer, had to resign following allegations of corruption. Commission led by Romano Prodi 
failed  the  institutional  reform.  Many  authors  believe  that  the  Commission,  as  the  engine  of 
European integration, has lost its dignity as the two summits in Nice and Stockholm have shown. 
  Governments have dominated the agenda of these meetings and the role of  the Commission 
to arbitrate the negotiations between the governments in antagonistic positions was played without 
success.    At  the  same  time,  governments  have  done  nothing  to  obstacles  encountered  in  the 
transition to EMU. 
The functioning of European institutions have made numerous faults, that have sent clear 
signals that mechanisms should be reviewed, made more flexible and equipped with levers that it 
can  overcome  conflict  situations.  Often,  the  Commission  has  not  made  the  most  appropriate 
proposals in connection with major decisions on the EU agenda.  
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  The collegial nature of its operation and the autonomous decision of the Commissioners 
have eroded over time. Decision procedures were unduly prolonged and became cumbersome and 
inefficient. 
  Council of Ministers is defined by a sporadic character of its meetings, which have so far 
only found a place, in the national political agendas that allow consensus. The Parliament was in the 
paradox situation, of not having the mechanisms of dissolution and calling early elections, which 
had lessen his functionality. 
Moreover, on 16 March 1999, European Commission resigned following the accusations of 
fraud, mismanagement and nepotism in the publication on March 15 report, by an independent 
Committee. 
  This required rapid reform of the Commission, and emphasized the general need for internal 
reform to make EU institutions more democratic, transparent and respectable. European Parliament 
and Council have been equally criticized for their lack of openness and democracy. Internal reforms 
have been proposed just to be able to address these short-circuits in all three institutions.  
  The new European institutional project (The Constitutional Treaty, Lisbon Treaty) attempted 
to define political and legal principles in a form "understandable" to everyone, able to guarantee - at 
the same time - the interests of the Union's key components: 
•  Members; 
•  People; 
•  Regions. 
  The choice would be the federal, decentralized, based on the double democratic legitimacy: 
•  the people versus the states and regions; 
•  the federal versus intergovernmental. 
  The  Council  would  participate  in  decision-making  on  equal  terms  with  the  institution 
representative of the people (EP), the execution of decisions remaining primarily at the state level. 
  Let‘s hope that this institutional project will make the EU politically effective, economically 
efficient and more open with themselves and the world. 
  While not perfect, the Constitution and Lisbon Treaty are very important steps that increase 
the institutional efficiency and unlock the main themes of European integration creating also a new 
political model. 
  EU is characterized by being a reality and not a static process thus, the treaties and his 
reform or results should not be considered as definitive.  
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